In many countries, firms face institutional "voids" that raise the costs of doing business and thwart entrepreneurial activity. We examine a particular mechanism that may address those voids: minority state ownership. Minority stakes are less affected by the "agency distortions" commonly found for full-fledged state ownership. Using panel data from publicly traded firms in Brazil, where the government holds minority stakes through its development bank, we find a positive effect of those stakes on firms' returns on assets and on the capital expenditures of financially constrained firms with investment opportunities. However, these positive effects are substantially reduced when minority stakes are allocated to business group affiliates and as local institutions develop. Therefore, we shed light on the firm-level implications of minority state ownership, a topic that has received scant attention in the strategy literature.
Strategy scholars adopting an institutions-based view have argued that emerging economies are plagued with myriad voids in institutions that critically affect firm-level behavior and performance (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; CuervoCazurra & Dau, 2009; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009) . Shallow capital markets, ineffective legal systems, and a poor supply of qualified labor are typical voids that raise the cost of doing business and thwart entrepreneurial activity. Scholars have studied various strategies to overcome these voids. One possibility is to forge collaborative networks to build trust and pool collective resources (Boisot & Child, 1996; Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008; Peng & Heath, 1996) . Firms can also build large business groups: collections of units belonging to common controlling shareholders, usually via cascading chains of ownership. Through their internal, corporate markets, groups can provide affiliates with capital, labor, or other inputs that are scarce in external markets (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Leff, 1978; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) .
This article examines another possibility for addressing institutional voids: minority state ownership. Development economists have emResearch assistance was ably provided by Cláudia Bruschi, Daniel Correa de Miranda, Darcio Lazzarini, Diego ten de Campos Maia, Fabio Renato Fukuda, Fernando Graciano Bignotto, Guilherme de Moraes Attuy, Luciana Shawyuin Liu, Lucille Assad Goloni, Marcelo de Biazi Goldberg, Rafael de Oliveira Ferraz, and William Nejo Filho. The authors are grateful for conversations with and comments on early drafts from Dirk Boehe, Vinicius Carrasco, Rafael Di Tella, Rosilene Marcon, João M. Pinho de Mello, and Luiz Mesquita, as well as from seminar participants at Harvard, FEA/USP, Insper, Insead, and the 2011 Strategic Management Society Special Conference in Rio. We also are thankful for the insightful comments and suggestions by three anonymous referees and our AMJ associate editor, Gerard George. Part of this research was conducted during Sergio Lazzarini's visit to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, with financial support from Insper and CAPES (process BEX 3835/09-0). An older version, written by the last two authors, was circulated with the title "Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: A Study of Equity Purchases by the Brazilian National Development Bank, 1995-2003" and  phasized that an important constraint in emerging markets is scarcity of long-term capital to fund promising entrepreneurial projects (Armendáriz de Aghion, 1999; Rodrik, 2004; Torres Filho, 2009; Yeyati, Micco, & Panizza, 2004) . Following this argument is the view that state capital can help boost entrepreneurial activity by stimulating investments in projects that would otherwise remain unfunded (George & Prabhu, 2000; Mazzucato, 2011) . However, state capital also entails various risks. Agency theory suggests that state ownership creates a host of distortions caused by principal-agent conflicts, because governments may force firms to appoint particular managers or pursue projects on the basis of political criteria instead of efficiency and profitability ones (Alchian, 1965; Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) . Consistently with this view, a flurry of empirical research has shown that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) typically perform worse than private firms (for reviews, see Chong and Lopez-deSilanes [2005] and Megginson and Netter [2001] ). Full state control has therefore been viewed as a dysfunctional or at best temporary organizational strategy: a "grabbing hand" detrimental to performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998) .
The extant research, however, has not paid sufficient attention to a new form of state involvement that does not entail majority control. In several countries, the state instead participates in the ownership of corporations as a minority shareholder. To illustrate, consider the following information on the largest 100 publicly traded corporations in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, from the Standard & Poor's Capital IQ database. In 2007, firms with more than 10 percent of state ownership represented between 33 percent (Brazil) and 50 percent (China) of the total market capitalization of those top firms. Instances with minority stakes were nontrivial. Thus, in 39 percent of the observed cases, the state had less than 50 percent of company equity. Although governments sometimes purchase minority equity positions as part of a bailout (as in the case of General Motors in 2008), in many countries governments actively invest in equity through various vehicles, such as development banks, sovereign wealth funds, and pension funds (Bremmer, 2010 ). Yet state minority stakes remain a poorly understood phenomenon, despite their prevalence and relevance in public debate (as evidenced, for instance, by the Economist's special report on state capitalism [Wooldridge, 2012] ).
Building on complementary theoretical perspectives, we offer an integrative set of hypotheses to explain the emergence and firm-level implications of minority state ownership. In a nutshell, our theory is as follows: As noted before, minority state capital can supplant institutional voids in emerging economies by allowing resource-constrained firms to invest in productive assets and profitable projects. Because these are minority stakes, majority control will be in the hands of profit-oriented shareholders. Thus, unless the government of a state has some form of residual ability to intervene, agency distortions commonly found in full-fledged SOEs should be less intense when the state participates with minority capital. But why should ownership (equity) have this effect, instead of, say, loans (debt) from state-owned banks? Drawing on Williamson's (1988) transaction cost logic, we propose that the positive effect of equity investments depends on the nature of the underlying assets. Unlike debt, equity does not imply a prespecified rate of return and is more flexible, responding more to future strategic adjustments. Thus, equity should be particularly helpful when firms have opportunity to engage in long-term fixed investments for which, however, they do not have enough capital. In some sense, the government of their state acts as a venture capitalist, supporting firms with constrained investment opportunity. Furthermore, if government allocations are carried out through minority stakes with restrained political interference, then the positive effect on firm-level outcomes may occur, without the downside of the state's grabbing hand occurring as well.
We also propose two key contingencies affecting the benefits of state minority ownership. First, we submit that the positive effect of such minority stakes is attenuated when target firms belong to business groups. If groups already reduce resource constraints through their internal markets, then government equity should be more beneficial when it is not allocated to group affiliates. Furthermore, agency theory also supports the view that minority state capital may be used to rescue other companies in the pyramid comprising a business group or simply expropriated by the majority shareholders of the group (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005) . Therefore, from the point of view of group affiliates, state and group capital act as substitutes (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005) ; however, business groups and state minority investments can act as complements in an economy as a whole if government targets independent firms. Second, we argue that the positive effect of minority state ownership is reduced when institutional improvements progressively attenuate or mitigate voids. For instance, substantial development of local capital markets greatly enhances firm access to market-based sources of financing, thereby reducing the need for state capital. Thus, we not only examine firm-level implications of minority state ownership stakes, but also discuss factors that should make those stakes conducive to superior performance.
We tested our theory using panel data from 367 publicly listed Brazilian companies observed between 1995 and 2009. Brazil was an appropriate empirical context for our purposes for at least three reasons. First, in that period, the ratio of Brazil's average stock market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) was 43.1 percent, compared to 98.7 percent in Chile and 129.7 percent in the United States. Thus, relative to other countries, Brazilian firms were more constrained in terms of equity financing. Second, our chosen temporal window encompasses an important privatization wave-by itself, an external shock that changed the ownership structure of many companies. Interestingly, the process of privatization in Brazil was accompanied by the rise of a new form of indirect state ownership of corporations via equity purchases by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), through its investment subsidiary, BNDESPAR. Responsible for executing Brazil's privatization program, the bank actively sought to form consortia with private acquirers, relinquishing majority control even when it provided loans and equity (De Paula, Ferraz, & Iootty, 2002) . The size of these allocations-US$53 billion by 2009 -triggered criticism that these equity purchases favored large local business groups with the financial clout to execute their projects alone, without help from the development bank (e.g. Almeida, 2009) . Third, also during the sample period, Brazil made important promarket reforms that affected local institutional voids. For instance, stock market capitalization to GDP in Brazil jumped from 19 percent in 1995 to 73 percent in 2009. This phenomenon allows us to examine how the effect of minority stakes varies over time, according to changes in the extent of local voids.
THEORY: MINORITY STATE OWNERSHIP UNDER INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS
We propose a theory that explains how minority state ownership affects firm-level investment and performance in an environment in which firms face critical voids that undermine their ability to pursue profitable projects. Thus, we integrate several theoretical strands: the institution-based view of strategy (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2009) , agency theory (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988) , and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1988 (Williamson, , 1996 . We start with a discussion on how ownership of minority stakes by states differs from the more traditional forms of ownership involving full state control and on the conditions under which these minority stakes can positively influence firmlevel performance. Next, we outline contingencies that should moderate this positive effect.
Majority versus Minority Stakes of the State
The bulk of the literature on government ownership compares two polar modes of ownership: private control and majority state ownership. Most studies adopt an agency theory perspective by outlining the intrinsic conflicts that occur between the agents and principals of those firms. Under state ownership, conflicts are exacerbated because society (as a principal) delegates the monitoring of SOEs to politicians in charge of the government, who in turn are supposed to monitor SOE managers (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000) . Thus, SOEs will typically suffer interference from politicians trying to use those firms as mechanisms to transfer rents to their particular constituencies (Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998) . Governments may also pursue a "double bottom line" by requiring SOEs to meet goals other than profitability, such as high employment or low consumer prices (Mengistae & Xu, 2004; Shapiro & Willig, 1990) . Furthermore, without profit-oriented owners, SOE managers typically lack the strong ("high-powered") incentives commonly found in private firms (e.g., aggressive profit sharing) and are not subject to close monitoring by private owners acting as "residual claimants" (Gupta, 2005; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988) . All these factors should have a negative effect on firmlevel economic performance; empirical research generally supports this prediction (e.g., AnuattiNeto, Barossi-Filho, Carvalho, & Macedo, 2005; Boardman & Vining, 1989; Kikeri, Nellis, & Shirley, 1992; La Porta & López-de-Silanes, 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005) .
Fewer studies examine cases in which a government holds minority stakes. From a theoretical standpoint, if governments are minority shareholders, then they relinquish control of SOEs to other owners holding majority stakes. If these majority owners are profit maximizers, they will want to closely monitor executives or implement pay-forperformance practices that help reduce agency conflicts. Consequently, unless there is some form of residual interference by a state (a point to which we return later), the ability of governments or politicians to interfere in pricing or investment decisions is reduced if these actions conflict with the objectives of controlling owners. Consistently with this prediction, some studies have shown that firms with minority stakes owned by a government perform better than SOEs with majority state control, although not necessarily better than purely private companies (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Majumdar, 1998; Wu, 2011) .
However, if state minority ownership stakes only attenuate the agency problems rampant in SOEs and are therefore not expected to improve performance relative to privately owned firms, then why are such minority stakes prevalent in several countries? A possible explanation is that those stakes result from complex political processes whereby governments try to preserve their influence in their economy through embedded, intertwined networks of local capitalists (Pistor & Turkewitz, 1996; Stark, 1996) . But this explanation says little about the conditions under which minority equity may or may not affect performance. In what follows, we offer a theory proposing conditions under which minority stakes may actually improve firm-level profitability and investment.
State Minority Ownership in a Constrained Environment
Drawing from institutional theorists who argue that emerging countries are frequently inhibited by poorly enforced contracts and high transaction costs (North, 1990; Stone, Levy, & Paredes, 1996) , strategy scholars propose that weak country-level institutions have important implications for firmlevel performance (e.g., Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Peng et al., 2009) . Weak institutions are associated with numerous voids represented by shallow capital markets, costly legal enforcement, a scarce supply of skilled labor, and ineffective anticompetitive regulation, and other factors that severely constrain the entrepreneurial activity of local firms (e.g., Chacar et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 1997) . For instance, voids associated with scarce capital markets limit firms' ability to invest in profitable projects, especially projects requiring large, fixed capital allocations with long maturity (Levine, 2005; Rajan & Zingales, 1996) .
Starting from the premise that such voids may constrain local entrepreneurs in less developed countries, a vast literature on development finance has evolved to argue that government loans can alleviate capital constraints in the private sector and promote projects with positive net present value that might not otherwise have been undertaken (Rodrik, 2004; Torres Filho, 2009; Yeyati et al., 2004) . With new long-term capital unavailable or excessively costly in existing (private) markets, firms are able to achieve economies of scale, improve their operations, revamp technology, and so forth-all factors that should lead to superior performance. "Latent" capabilities can therefore turn into actual projects and spur the growth of new firms and industries (Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007) . Development scholars, however, have focused exclusively on the role of debt (i.e., loans, often subsidized) provided by state-owned banks. How can equity stakes help in the context of local voids, especially compared to what can be achieved through government loans?
Here we borrow from Williamson's (1988 Williamson's ( , 1996 ) discussion on the relative merits of debt and equity as alternative governance mechanisms. Using transaction cost logic, Williamson (1988 Williamson ( , 1996 argued that nonredeployable investments required to revamp production capabilities (such as dedicated technology and infrastructure) are best served by equity, because of the higher flexibility of this financing mode. While debt requires a fixed return over the duration of a contract, equity can better adapt to changing circumstances that might negatively affect the value of such assets. Shareholders have more discretion to meet and discuss strategies to reorganize a company and provide a longer-term time frame for the necessary changes.
Furthermore, because state actors value social goals other than pure profit maximization, minority state capital will tend to be more "patient" (Kaldor, 1980) . While private investors may seek short-term gains and exit in moments of market turmoil, state capital will more likely commit to projects with longer time horizons (McDermott, 2003) . With such an important long-term shareholder, target firms may more easily attain legitimacy and reputation in the marketplace, which has positive consequences for their capacity to attract valuable resources and partners (George & Prabhu, 2000; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009; Wu, 2011) . In addition, because minority stakes attenuate direct government control of target firms, the perceived risk that they will be subject to dysfunctional political interference will be lower. In sum, with reduced agency hazards, the cost of state equity should be compensated for by the benefit of an improved capacity to undertake profitable projects at the firm level. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: A caveat is that a state, as a powerful actor, may have a distinctive capacity to influence decisions, even in the position of minority shareholder. If this is the case, and if political interference occurs at the cost of reduced profitability, then one would instead expect a negative or null effect of minority state equity in cases in which a state has residual capacity to intervene. Thus, although our hypotheses predict a positive effect of minority state equity, in our subsequent empirical tests we also devise some strategies to examine the alternative hypothesis of residual control rights by a state.
As discussed above, superior investment capacity is a key mechanism underlying the positive effect of minority state equity. Thus, we again use Williamson's (1988 Williamson's ( , 1996 framework to propose that minority equity stakes improve firm performance by promoting capital expenditures (investment in long-term fixed assets). Although not all fixed assets are nonredeployable (e.g., generic land), the extent to which a firm invests in fixed capital is a signal that its business involves longerterm, riskier projects that can benefit from the flexibility of equity as a financing mode. However, investment per se may be neither necessary nor desirable (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996) . Even in an environment with critical voids, heterogeneity at the firm level may exist. Thus, a firm with access to multiple sources of capital will not be financially constrained (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988) and hence should not necessarily alter its investment activity simply because its state becomes a minority shareholder. Likewise, not all firms have promising projects with positive economic value (David et al., 2006) . In such cases, state-led injections of capital can be redirected to uses other than supporting profitable investment.
We thus propose that minority state capital positively promotes investment when firms face a condition of constrained opportunity. We define firms with constrained opportunity as those that have a valuable investment opportunity but are at the same time limited in their ability to attract longterm funding. We expect to find a positive association between minority state equity and investment in firms that have latent valuable projects but lack the necessary capital to consummate the required fixed investments. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. In less developed institutional settings, minority state ownership promotes capital expenditures by firms with constrained opportunity.
Contingent Effect of Target Firms' Participation in Business Groups
We also have reason to expect the effect of government equity to vary with the ownership structure of target firms. Since Leff's (1978) original contribution, scholars have proposed that business groups-that is, collections of firms under the same controlling entity-provide their affiliates with resources flowing through internal capital markets. Because resource allocations within groups are defined by fiat, according to the objectives of controlling shareholders, groups use internal capital markets to overcome the voids posed by scarce capital, labor, and product markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) . But if internal markets reduce external voids, we should expect state minority stakes to be more effective at increasing firm performance and promoting capital expenditures when target firms are not affiliated to groups. The latter should be relatively more affected by external voids than firms that have internal, group-level resources at their disposal (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005) .
Moreover, groups may be associated with the risk of minority shareholder expropriation. Most business groups are organized through complex pyramids involving firms that have stakes in other firms (Morck et al., 2005) . In countries with weak minority owner protection, state equity may be "tunneled" through complex pyramids to support controlling owners' private projects or rescue struggling internal units (Bae, Kang & Kim, 2002; Ber-trand, Djankov, Hanna, & Mullainathan, 2007) . Here the agency conflict involves the majority owners of a group and minority investors-including a state-providing group affiliates with extra capital. The state may thus increase the wealth of the business group's majority owners without necessarily improving the performance of the companies in which it invests. That is, the effect of state equity is attenuated by possible tunneling inside business groups. In keeping with this prediction, Giannetti and Laeven (2009) found that minority holdings by public pension funds increased firm value, but the effect was reduced when firms were part of business groups.
These two effects-groups substituting for external financing and their potential use of tunnelinglead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. In less developed institutional settings, the positive effect of minority state ownership on the performance of a firm is attenuated when the firm belongs to a pyramidal business group.
Hypothesis 4. In less developed institutional settings, the positive effect of minority state ownership on the capital expenditures of a firm with constrained opportunity is reduced when the firm belongs to a pyramidal business group.

Contingent Effect of Evolving Institutions
We argue that minority equity purchases by a state can help firms alleviate constraints in less developed institutional settings. Consequently, as institutions develop, the positive effect of those stakes should decline. For instance, in more developed capital markets, firms can raise equity capital in various forms. While firms that are already listed can issue new equity in stock markets, private firms can go public for the first time or, alternatively, lure private equity investors who could use stock markets as a future exit (divestment) mechanism. Shallow capital markets not only pose the constraint of scarce capital, but also lack transparent mechanisms for revealing company-level information and monitoring managers. Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Nenova (2005) asserted that underdeveloped capital markets make takeovers less likely and magnify governance conflicts. Lending some support to this claim, Sarkar, Sarkar, and Bhaumik's (1998) comparison of state-owned and private banks in India indicated that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, private companies are not unambiguously superior to SOEs. However, as capital markets develop, with more sophisticated mechanisms for capitalization and monitoring, new private investors will tend to emerge and gradually replace governments as sources of capital.
Strategy research adopting an institution-based view also provides support for this argument. Thus, in emerging market contexts firms benefit from a more network-based strategy of growth as a means to overcome resource scarcity (Boisot & Child, 1996; Peng & Heath, 1996) . Such networks can involve complex entanglements between firms and governments acting as providers of capital and other valuable resources (McDermott, 2003) . But if institutional reforms promote the development and sophistication of capital, labor, and product markets, then strategies based on public-private connections should become less important (Li, Park, & Li, 2004; Peng & Luo, 2000) . Hence, firms may gradually reduce their dependence on their state for scarce resources (Keister, 2004) .
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A key element of our theory is firm-level investment; therefore, we examine how institutional development affects the behavior of firms with constrained opportunity. An implication of the above discussion is that a progressive reduction in institutional voids should alleviate the resource constraints of firms with valuable projects that require large capital expenditures. Therefore, a state will become less instrumental in fostering new investment. Furthermore, given that group affiliates can overcome institutional voids through internal markets, it follows that the attenuation of constraints posed by external voids should especially affect firms that do not belong to groups. Thus, standalone firms will more likely be relieved of their resource constraints as improvements in local institutions deepen the capital, labor, and product markets. This logic leads to our final set of hypotheses: 
PRIVATIZATION AND MINORITY STATE OWNERSHIP IN BRAZIL
In Brazil, SOEs have prevailed in diverse sectors, including banking and railways, since the 19th century. But the Brazilian state's sphere of influence increased after World War I, especially in the 1940s, when the government of Getúlio Vargas inaugurated an ambitious plan of government investment in steel mills, mining, chemicals, and a wide array of other sectors (Baer, Kerstenetzky, & Villela, 1973; Musacchio, 2009) . Throughout the subsequent decades, pyramidal business groups began to be organized, with ten or more SOEs in multiple sectors linked to a holding company at the top (Trebat, 1983) .
A series of joint studies conducted in 1952 by the governments of Brazil and the United States concerned with investing in the expansion of Brazil's infrastructure led to the creation of a national development bank to provide long-term credit for energy and transportation investments. The Brazilian National Bank of Economic Development (abbreviated as BNDE in Portuguese, later as BNDES when "social development" was added to its mission) assumed over the following decade other roles, including financing machinery purchases in foreign currency, serving as guarantor in credit operations abroad, and lending directly to Brazilian companies. In the 1970s, BNDES began, through different programs, to invest directly in the equity of Brazilian companies. In 1982, it created BNDES Participations (BNDESPAR) to manage those holdings.
In the early 1990s, in the midst of financial instability, hyperinflation, and high budget deficits, the Brazilian government began to reconsider investment in SOEs because of the high opportunity cost of holding equity in these companies (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 1994) . Thus, the governments of Fernando Collor (1990 -92) and. especially. of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) undertook a major privatization program aimed at reducing debt and improving productivity, eventually collecting about $87 billion dollars in privatization revenues. At the same time, a process of market liberalization was being undertaken, with diminished tariffs in various sectors and the progressive entry of foreign capital. Between 1996 and 2000, the participation of foreign companies in the total revenues of industries increased from 27 to 42 percent (De Negri, 2003) .
BNDES played three roles in the privatization process. First, it served as an agent of the government in privatization transactions, selling and sometimes financing operations. Second, it provided loans to private and public enterprises. Third, through its equity-holding arm BNDESPAR, the bank purchased minority stakes in a variety of publicly traded firms. BNDES was involved in the privatization process not only to deflect criticism that the state was losing its grip on the economy, but also, by making available substantial capital, to attract private players to the ongoing auctions. Approximately 86 percent of the revenues collected from privatization auctions came from block sales, acquirers typically forming consortia that included domestic groups, foreign investors, and public entities such as BNDESPAR and pension funds of state-owned companies (Anuatti-Neto et al., 2005; De Paula et al., 2002; Lazzarini, 2011) . Table 1 shows how BNDES's holdings (through BNDESPAR) evolved in our sample of firms between 1995 and 2009. Such holdings can be direct or indirect; the latter occurs when BNDES owns an intermediate firm that in turn owns the final target firm. As an illustration, consider the case of Vale, depicted in Figure 1 . In that year, BNDES' stake in Vale was indirect because BNDES had stakes in a holding company, Valepar, which in turn had direct stakes in Vale. Because pyramidal structures are complex and often involve unlisted companies, the size of BNDES' indirect holdings is not always publicly available. Table 1 shows that, in each of those years, BNDES held equity stakes in several companies, more than half being direct equity purchases. BNDES' direct equity stakes averaged 16 percent of the firms' total equity. Active bailouts and conversions of debt for equity notwithstanding, most of these equity holdings were part of an explicit strategy of investment management formulated by BNDESPAR analysts in tandem with the restructuring events of the 1990s.
DATA AND METHODS
Data Set
We used data that tracks basic financial information and ownership for 367 Brazilian firms between 1995 and 2009. All enterprises listed on the São Paolo stock market (Bovespa) during that period for which we could collect reliable financial and ownership information are included. We analyze these firms' ownership profiles and financial information using such diverse sources as reports filed with the CVM (the Brazilian equivalent of the US Securities and Exchange Commission) and the Economática, Interinvest, and Valor Grandes Grupos databases.
We cleaned the data set in several ways. First, we dropped financial firms and publicly listed holding corporations (i.e., we only kept their affiliates). Second, we eliminated inconsistent financial information, such as cases in which total assets were different from total liabilities. Third, to mitigate distortions by extreme values, we winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles those key variables that vary substantially (chiefly performance and investment variables). The panel is unbalanced as a result of mergers, acquisitions, business attrition, and missing information for some financial variables.
Our variables are described below. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics.
Dependent Variables
Firm-level performance. We employ two measures of performance. Our first measure, return on assets (ROA), corresponds to net profits over total assets in a given year. To incorporate long-term performance effects and gauge sources of value not fully captured by accounting data (e.g., intangibles), we also collected data on firms' stock market valuation. Our second measure, market-to-book, computed as the total market value of stocks divided by the book value of equity (e.g., Fama, 1992) , is an indicator of future return on equity and hence incorporates future market expectations about firm-level performance (Penman, 1996) .
Fixed investment. Following previous work (Behr, Norden, & North, 2013; Fazzari et al., 1988) , we measured fixed investment as the ratio of a firm's yearly capital expenditures to its initial stock of fixed capital (observed at end of the previous year). Unfortunately, we were unable to find reliable data on more refined measures of nonredeployable investment, such as R&D expenditures. However, in less developed markets, firms tend to have pressing needs to invest in infrastructure and machinery so as to build industrial production capacity. Development scholars see accelerated fixed investment as critical in helping emerging nations catch up to advanced, industrialized economies (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 2002; Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, & Stiglitz, 2009 ). We thus believe that the extent of fixed asset investments is correlated with firms' orientation toward complex, long-maturity projects, for which the flexibility of equity can be of particular help.
Explanatory Variables
State minority equity. Given the prevalence of pyramidal ownership structures in Brazil (Valadares & Leal, 2000) , we coded both direct and indirect equity stakes. Minority state equity, referred to as minority in our regressions, was thus measured in three complementary ways. Direct equity holdings by the state (through BNDESPAR) constitute a continuous variable that measures the per- b Indirect stakes occur when BNDESPAR participates in pyramidal ownership structures (e.g., BNDES owns Valepar, which in turn owns Vale; see Figure 1 ). centage of equity held by the bank (from 0 to 100%). In contrast, our measure of total stakes (direct or indirect) is discrete because, as discussed before, we do not have precise information on the magnitude of indirect BNDES equity holdings in pyramidal chains. We thus created a dummy variable set equal to 1 for a company among whose owners is another company in which BNDES has equity, and 0 otherwise.
2 To address the alternative hypothesis that the state may have residual interference, with negative implications for profitability, we also created two new dummy variables indicating whether a BNDES direct stake was more than 0 percent (i.e., there is some stake) or more than 10 percent. We exploit a particular feature of the Brazilian legislation indicating that shareholders with more than 10 percent of a firm's equity can require a seat on its board of directors. Thus, the 10 percent cutoff is an indication of a potential distinctive capacity of the Brazilian government to influence decisions.
Membership in business groups. We also coded for state equity ownership (via BNDESPAR) in a company that belongs to a pyramidal business group. Figure 1 shows that Vale is, itself, a pyramidal group, given that the company has stakes in several other firms (Samitri, MRS, Samarco, etc.) . Thus, in 2003 BNDES had an indirect stake in a pyramidal group. A firm was considered a member of a group when it was controlled by an owner or owners who controlled other firms in our data set. To detect the existence of controlling stakes, we conducted a detailed analysis of shareholder agreements, which were available at the website of the CVM. Thus, we identified owners who had distinctive control rights over a firm (i.e., more seats on its board of directors). Multinationals with single subsidiaries in Brazil were not treated as groups, even though they usually control multiple units across the world. Our goal was to find instances in which local controlling shareholders could use new allocations to transfer funds to localunits. Using such criteria, we created the dummy variable group, 1. Return on assets which is equal to 1 if a company belongs to a business group and 0 otherwise. About 45 percent of our observations are from firms belonging to some group. To test our hypotheses that the effect of state equity depends on business group membership, we multiply the minority variables by the dummy variable group. Constrained opportunity. To measure constrained opportunity, we needed to observe cases in which firms have investment opportunities but are at the same time constrained in their ability to attract funding. We measured such constrained opportunities by creating a composite variable with two key elements. First, following previous work (David et al., 2006) , we computed the Tobin's Q of the firms in the database (as the market value of stocks plus the book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets). We then measured investment opportunity with a dummy variable Q, which is equal to 1 if Tobin's Q exceeds unity and 0 otherwise. Thus, cases with Q equal to 1 indicate that a unit increase in total assets is expected to yield an increase in a firm's market value by more than one monetary unit. In other words, the firm can create market value by expanding its assets (David et al., 2006) . Second, we gauged financial constraints by computing the ratio of net profits to initial stock of fixed capital (Behr et al., 2013; Fazzari et al., 1988) . The larger this ratio, the higher a firm's ability to invest using profits from its own operations. Constraint is thus a dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm's ratio of net profits to the stock of fixed capital was below the sample median and 0 otherwise. Compared to other companies in the sample, a firm with constraint coded 1 has low cash flow relative to its stock of fixed assets and thus needs to attract more external capital in case of a planned expansion. Finally, we combined Q and constraint (C) to create our measure constrained opportunity, coded 1 if both Q and C are equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Constrained opportunity was interacted with both the minority and the group dummy.
Institutional variables. To test our hypothesis of a diminished effect of state equity in promoting investment as institutions develop, we begin by using as an interacted variable a simple count measure of time (e.g., Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010) , beginning with a value of 1 for the first year of the series (1995). The objective was to assess how the effect of state equity changed over the years. We then followed Chacar et al. (2010) Because these measures are highly correlated with time (e.g., r ϭ .73 for stock market capitalization), they may spuriously pick a natural improvement trend in the local environment. To avoid this confounding effect, we measured instead the percentage of yearly variation in those variables, using three-year moving average windows to reduce distortions by short-term effects.
3 In addition, whenever we add a specific institutional variable, we also add, as controls, time and its interaction with our key variables of interest. With this procedure, our institutional variables essentially measure percent variations above or below a natural trend captured by the variable for time.
Control Variables
Control variables include a measure of size, ln(revenues), which is the logarithm of gross revenues, in thousands of US dollars, as well as two financial measures, fixed (fixed assets to total assets) and leverage (debt to total assets). Distinct ownership patterns are captured by two dummies, foreign control and state control, coded for whether a firm's majority (controlling) owner was the state or a foreign entity, respectively; thus, domestic pri-vate control was the baseline case. Because state minority ownership may occur jointly with industrial concentration (e.g., a state may try to create "national champions" in a given sector), we added the control merger, coded 1 if a firm resulted from a merger or acquisition deal and 0 otherwise. All variables used in interactions with state minority stakes (group, constrained opportunity, and institutional variables) were additionally employed as controls to guarantee that omitted main effects did not drive any measured effect of the interactions.
Estimation Approach
In an ideal experimental situation, the state (via BNDES) would buy shares of Brazilian companies randomly. However, BNDES selectively chooses its target firms. Therefore, simple regressions assessing the effect of BNDES stakes on firm-level outcomes may suffer from selection bias or endogeneity caused by unobservable factors affecting both the likelihood of state ownership and the outcomes under examination (performance and investment). To circumvent this problem, we proceeded in several complementary ways. First, in our panel regressions we adopted a fixed-effects approach (Wooldridge, 2002) by including time-invariant company-specific effects, time-varying industrylevel effects (i.e., industry membership dummies interacted with year dummies), and year effects. We thus essentially measure within-firm performance variations net of fixed and temporal factors that will simultaneously affect all companies in the same industry.
4 This is possible in our data because our period is associated with intense corporate restructuring and changes in corporate control (e.g., privatizations). In other words, our data exhibit variation over time in terms of ownership.
Second, following the approach proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), we ran additional regressions combining fixed-effects estimation with propensity score matching. While fixed effects control for unobservable factors potentially causing spurious inference, propensity score matching allows for the creation of comparable control groups with traits similar to those of the firms observed with BNDES stakes during our temporal window. Our regressions are thus analogous to differences-in-differences estimation assessing both within-firm variation over time and betweenfirm comparison of cases with and without state equity (e.g., Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2007) . More specifically, using variables observed in the first year of the sample (1995), we used probit regressions to assess which firm-level traits explain whether a given company will be observed with a BNDES stake in the two ways described before (i.e., directly or indirectly through layers of ownership). Firm-level traits include ln(revenues), leverage, fixed assets, foreign control, state control, and a host of industry dummies. Propensity scores were then computed using kernel matching to generate regression weights for the subsequent panel regressions, in which performance and investment are dependent variables (Nichols, 2007) . This technique guarantees that firms without BNDES stakes but with traits similar to those of BNDES companies will receive more weight in the performance and investment regressions. Furthermore, we restricted our analysis to firms with and without BNDES stakes in regions of common support-that is, a subset of firms with attributes within a similar range based on computed propensity scores (Heckman et al., 1997) . Although at the cost of a reduced sample size, this procedure makes the subgroups with and without BNDES stakes more directly comparable.
Third, we ran additional regressions checking alternative explanations for our results. Selection equations were used to see if the state chose highperforming firms to invest in, which could yield a spurious causal inference between minority state ownership and performance. If, as critics of industrial policy contend, governments frequently "pick winners" (e.g., Pack & Saggi, 2006) , the apparent positive effect of stakes may be spurious; that is, BNDES may be selecting high performers instead of increasing the performance of the firms in which it invests. We also check whether BNDES equity stakes have implications for the attraction of debt, which represents an alternative, nonhypothesized channel for the effect of minority state ownership. To examine this possibility, we used leverage (as 4 A possible source of concern is that BNDES may actively select regulated sectors that will likely receive subsidies or profitable governmental contracts. However, although 33.7 percent of the cases involve regulated utilities such as electricity and gas, 42.6 percent of the observed instances of BNDES equity are in manufacturing industries (metals, chemicals, paper, and so on) which operate in more or less competitive markets. Furthermore, systematic and temporal effects associated with industry membership are already controlled for in our regressions with our firm-and industry-year fixed effects.
previously defined) and financial expenses (the ratio of interest payments and amortizations to total debt) as dependent variables in regressions to which minority state equity and controls were added as independent variables. Table 3 reports the results of our regressions assessing the effect of minority state equity on performance. Models 1-4 examine the effect of stakes on ROA: The first two models measure the effect of direct and indirect equity stakes; the next two models assess direct equity stakes only; and the last two models evaluate differential effects depending on whether BNDES equity is higher than 0 percent or 10 percent. We show estimates with and without weights based on propensity score matching (except for the last two models, which owing to space limitations are fitted only with the matching correction). The number of observed firms in the regressions with control for matching is lower because, as explained earlier, our adopted technique restricts the analysis to data points in regions of common support (i.e., comparable firms).
FINDINGS
Effect of Minority State Equity on Performance
Consistently with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we generally find positive effects of minority stakes and negative effects when those stakes are interacted with group membership. Model 1 shows that companies with the Brazilian state as a minority shareholder (directly or indirectly) have a return on assets 11.1 percentage points higher than that of other firms, although the effect is wiped out when stakes are allocated to firms belonging to pyramidal groups (p Ͻ .05). Specifically, the coefficient of minority times group (where minority is measured as a dummy coding direct or indirect stakes) indicates that state ownership associated with group affiliates reduces the aforementioned positive effect by 13.1 percentage points. However, the results are not robust to the specification with matching (model 2): the coefficients become statistically insignificant.
More robust effects are found when we use the continuous measure coding the state's direct percent of participation in a firm's equity. The coefficient of minority is now positively significant in the regressions with and without control for matching. For instance, estimates of model 4 (with matching) indicate that an increase of 1 percentage point of BNDES direct equity is expected to increase a firm's return on assets by 0.4 percentage points (p Ͻ .01).
5 Again, this effect disappears when the target firm belongs to a pyramidal group: The coefficient of minority times group shows that group membership attenuates that positive effect by 0.7 percentage points (p Ͻ .05). Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are consistently supported only when the state participates directly in the equity of the target firms. Possibly, if the state provides capital to controlling firms in a pyramid instead of directly to firms, that capital may also be allocated to uses other than the financing of the target firms' own projects.
The results of models 5 and 6 allow us to examine what happens when BNDES has some direct equity (i.e., Ͼ 0%) versus more than 10 percent. If BNDES's enhanced equity allows the Brazilian government to exert dysfunctional influence in a board of directors or in any other way, then we should observe a negative or null effect. Yet we find just the opposite result: the effect of BNDES equity is only positive when participation is beyond 10 percent (p Ͻ .01). Interestingly, having more than 10 percent of a firm's equity also does not help reduce the negative interaction that BNDES equity has with group membership. That is, even with enhanced equity participation, the state apparently remains less influential than the other majority shareholders who control a group.
Models 7-12 in turn show similar specifications using the market-to-book ratio as a dependent variable. Although some statistical significance is found in model 12, wherein our variable minority involves stakes are higher than 10 percent, in the other models the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, we find more robust support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 mostly when ROA is the dependent variable. A possible explanation is that state equity may be alleviating short-term constraints of the target firms, which are reflected in its current accounting indicators, but market participants do not value this effect in their long-term projections. Another 5 We also tested for nonlinear effects by adding the quadratic term minority squared in the case of direct stakes. However, the coefficient was found to be insignificant. Although our estimates may indicate a linear effect, it is important to recall that the stakes are minority ones: Acquiring majority control is not part of BNDES policy. Furthermore, the bank avoids concentrating too much capital in a single firm because of demands to provide capital to firms in multiple sectors. 
Effect of Minority State Equity on Fixed Investments
We next tested Hypotheses 3 and 4 by assessing how state equity affects the investment of firms with constrained opportunity, interacting minority with constrained opportunity and with constrained opportunity times group. As per Hypothesis 3, we expected the interactions between the minority stake variables and constrained opportunity to be positive, because state capital will trigger new investment, especially in the case of financially constrained firms with valuable projects. As for Hypothesis 4, we expected the interactions between the stake variables and constrained opportunity times group to be negative, with the positive effect of state capital larger in the case of firms that do not belong to groups. Given that we were introducing three-way interactions, we also added as controls all possible two-way interactions between key variables (e.g., Chari & David, 2012) . Table 4 shows the corresponding regressions. As in our previous performance results, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only consistently supported when minority stakes are direct (models 3 and 4). The inference is robust to the alternative methods with and without matching. If we use the estimates with matching (model 4), we see that an increase of one percentage point in state equity is expected to increase capital expenditures by more than three times the initial stock of the fixed capital of firms with constrained opportunity (p Ͻ .05). This result suggests that these firms are in a process of accelerated growth or have very low initial stock of fixed capital. In addition, the coefficient of the three-way interaction (minority ϫ constrained opportunity ϫ group) indicates that, again, the aforementioned positive effect disappears in the case of firms belonging to groups. The main effect of state capital (minority) is insignificant. In sum, minority state equity promotes investment only in the case of stand-alone firms with constrained opportunity and when equity investments are directly allocated to target firms instead of indirectly through layers of ownership.
Effect of Institutional Development
Given that we only found significant effects of direct minority capital, to test Hypotheses 5 and 6 we restricted our analysis of institutional effects to those direct stakes only. For robustness, we also controlled for matching in all regressions.
6 Table 5  essentially expands model 4 of Table 4 by adding interactions between the institutional variables and the previously interacted variables (minority ϫ constrained opportunity and minority ϫ constrained opportunity ϫ group). Given that we had three-and four-way interactions, we again added all possible lower-order interactions as controls (Chari & David, 2012) . Every column in Table 5 introduces a particular institutional variable, beginning with the simple count variable for time in model 1 and the other, more refined variables in models 2-6.
In keeping with Hypotheses 5 and 6, estimates from the first model show that the positive effect of state equity in promoting new investments for firms with constrained opportunity has diminished over time, especially in firms that do not belong to groups (p Ͻ .01). A similar pattern is found for the institutional variables ease of credit (model 3), stock market capitalization to GDP (model 4), and availability of skilled labor (model 6). Recall that, to avoid spurious inference due to natural improvement trends in the local economy correlated with these particular institutional variables, in models 2-6 we added time and all its interactions as controls. Thus, our results confirm that positive improvements in local institutions-in other words, a gradual mitigation of voids-tend to reduce the benefits of minority state capital. For instance, the significant effect of the capital market variables suggests that firms may become progressively less dependent on state capital as credit as equity markets develop.
7
Robustness Check: Are Our Results Driven by Selection?
As an additional robustness test complementing our fixed-effects approach with and without match-ing, we unveil the selection process by performing additional regressions using state equity as a dependent variable and the firm-level variables ROA, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and fixed assets as explanatory variables. For instance, if BNDES is selecting firms that already have superior capabilities, then the effect of ROA and market-to-book would likely be positive. We used the lagged values of these variables because BNDES likely observes past variables in its equity investment decisions. Also, given that minority was a discrete variable, but we wanted to control for unobservable firmspecific characteristics that might affect BNDES's choice of companies in which to participate, we adopt the conditional logit model (Chamberlain, 1980) , a fixed-effects specification for discrete data. To check whether effects change when the percentage of the state's direct stake is considered, we ran additional fixed-effects regressions using our continuous measure of direct stakes as a dependent variable. Moreover, because our period of analysis covers the term of two distinct presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10), we separated our regressions into two periods, 1995-2002 and 2003-09 , to determine whether the changes in the effect of state equity found over the years are the result of changes in the government itself. Models 1 and 4 of Table 6 show the results for the whole period. All variables are insignificant at conventional levels, suggesting that our results are not driven by selection.
8 Thus, models 1 and 4 of Table 6 indicate that, during the whole period, the bank did not systematically select companies on the basis of past performance or other financial indicators. Splitting our regressions for the two periods also fails to reveal substantial differences. While during 1995-2002 we detect significant effects of market-to-book and constrained opportunity when stakes are assessed indirectly or directly (model 2), these effects do not hold when direct stakes only are considered (model 5). Estimates when the dependent variable measures direct stakes (models 4 -6) are widely insignificant, except for the marginally significant effect of fixed assets or foreign control in the subsample for 2003-09. However, this should not be a source of concern, because those variables are themselves controls in our performance and investment regressions (Tables 3 and 4 ). In addition, given that only 8 The number of observations in the conditional logit model is substantially reduced because the model drops cases without within-firm variance in allocations (i.e., firms in which BNDES never invested or equally invested during the whole period). Our key predicted mechanism is that state ownership alleviates investment constraints, especially for companies with large capital needs. An alternative mechanism is that BNDES could increase leverage in a firm in which it has bought equity by opening lines of credit (from its own banking arm or from other banks). We therefore ran our regressions with two distinct dependent variables: leverage and financial expenses. Models 1-4 of Table 7 indicate that state equity does not significantly change leverage. That is, when BNDES becomes a minority shareholder, it does not appear to improve access to loans. Models 5-8, in turn, examine whether state equity affects financial expenses. Although we found a significantly negative effect of minority in model 5, the effect did not hold when we controlled for matching (model 6). Thus, we fail to find consistent support for the alternative explanation that state equity may be affecting firms' ability to attract loans. This finding is consistent with allegations that BNDESPAR, BNDES's equity arm, usually operates independently not only of the bank unit responsible for debt financing, but of other banks as well. Although BNDES contributed to an important portion of Aracruz's equity in its stage of accelerated growth, the bank acted as a minority shareholder and progressively sold some of its shares to private owners Safra and Lorentzen. The presence of private controllers notwithstanding, Aracruz was practically managed as a focused, stand-alone firm, with improved governance practices (after its period of initial growth, the firm even managed to list advisory depository shares on the New York Stock Exchange). This case therefore illustrates how minority equity by the Brazilian state can be used to boost productive fixed investments in a context of reduced risk of expropriation.
In contrast, NET illustrates a potential negative effect of group membership. The firm was a subsidiary of Globo, a large media group in Brazil founded by journalist Irineu Marinho in 1925. Indirectly through Globopar, the Marinho family held stakes in publishing and printing companies as well as in cable, satellite, and Internet service providers, among other businesses. By 1999, the Marinho family, through Globopar's pyramid, had acquired majority control of Globo Cabo, also known as NET. To support its ambitious plans to expand broadband infrastructure in Brazil, BNDESPAR agreed to capitalize NET with the purchase of shares worth around $89 million dollars. 9 As an additional test, we collected new data on whether the firms in our data set voluntarily adhered to the so-called New Market, a set of governance rules involving improved transparency and accountability. Of the firms that adhered to the New Market by 2009, 15 percent had BNDES equity. Of the firms outside the New Market, a slightly higher portion, 21 percent, had BNDES equity. Adding a dummy, New Market, to explain selection (i.e., in the specifications reported in Table 6 ) also did not yield significant results. Thus, at least with respect to firms with and without the New Market rules, there is no indication that firms with (presumably) improved governance practices were systematically selected.
10 For yet another test, using 2002-09 data collected for a companion paper (Lazzarini et al., 2012) , we more directly assessed whether receiving BNDES equity implied receiving BNDES loans-which are heavily subsidized and, unlike equity allocations, directly affect profitability. The correlation between dummy variables coding whether firms had BNDES equity/loans is very small (Ϫ.03) and not statistically significant at conventional levels. The currency crisis that affected Brazil in the late 1990s, however, drove up Globo's debt and put financial strain on Globopar and a number of its group affiliates, including NET. When NET's market expansion proved unsuccessful, with demand (the number of subscribers) falling short of expectations, it posted successive losses. In March 2002, the situation having become critical, the group announced a capitalization plan of around $430 million dollars. BNDES again agreed to contribute. The bank's involvement was, however, heavily criticized, some suggesting that it was acquiescing to the pressure of a strong domestic group. BNDES' new capital injections were then made conditional on a change in NET's governance practiceswhich, according to Eleazar de Carvalho, then president of BNDES, were "the basic and primordial element" of the problem.
11 This illustration is therefore consistent with our hypothesis and finding that the positive effect of state equity is attenuated when investments are allocated to pyramidal groups.
DISCUSSION AND FINAL REMARKS
Implications for Theory
From a theoretical standpoint, our article contributes with a new framework explaining the performance implications of minority state ownership. Building on the institution-based view of strategy and firm theories, we posit that minority stakes can have a positive impact on firm performance and investment-especially in the case of firms with latent investment opportunities but, at the same time, with severe constraints in their ability to assess external capital, which is often the case in developing and emerging economies. We also theorize and find supporting evidence that this performance effect is attenuated when target firms belong to business groups. Furthermore, we submit that the effect depends on institutional development. If minority state equity helps reduce voids in a local environment, then the value of those capital injections should diminish as capital, product, and labor markets develop. Thus, we unveil complex interactions between state ownership, group ownership, and environmental conditions commonly found in emerging markets.
In this sense, our theory advances researchers' understanding of the relatively overlooked phenomenon of minority state investment in emerging markets and contributes to the discussion about the pros and cons of state capitalism (Bremmer, 2010) . We inform this debate from the point of view of firms, by examining the conditions under which state ownership positively affects firm-level performance and investment. Furthermore, given our study's emphasis on firm-level outcomes, it also adds to the current debate in strategic management on nonmarket sources of performance heterogeneity associated with public policy and country-level institutional factors (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009; Peng et al., 2009; Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway, 2005) . Although there has been a flurry of research on how emerging market conditions affect firm-level strategies, studies focusing on the role of the state in which a firm is located as a source of differential performance have been scant. Similar analyses can be performed in other institutional contexts to gauge whether and in which conditions heterogeneous performance can be explained by active state policy.
In addition, after drawing from the literature on institutional voids, our study advances this literature by proposing ways in which local policies may be promoting instead of limiting. Strategy scholars have rarely examined in detail how state policies can affect industry-and firm-level development. Mahmood and Rufin's (2005) paper is a notable exception; they also discuss the role of state at various stages of development and propose a substitutive role between state intervention and business groups. However, while they discuss the costs and benefits of governmental centralization, we study cases in which a state participates in firms whose control is decentralized to private owners. We therefore shed light on the new-and understudied-forms of state capitalism whereby a state acts as a minority investor in the economy of its nation. Our findings thus suggest a new programmatic agenda wherein scholars not only examine how firms react to limiting institutions, but also how local policies can positively interact with private strategies to foster competitive advantage.
Implications for Practice
Our study also has important practical implications. While some authors contend that government interference in an economy creates inefficiency and crowds out private entrepreneurship, our evidence suggests that the state-led purchase of equity stakes in publicly traded corporations may not be problematic, depending on the governance profiles of target firms and stage of institutional development. In a context of poorly developed capital markets, state-backed, longterm equity can allow firms to undertake performance-enhancing projects and promote capital expenditures needed to achieve efficiency gains. The potential for political distortions associated with government ownership is attenuated in the case of minority holdings because these holdings leave other investors and managers to play the key roles in the private companies in which government invests. When the government injects capital into pyramidal groups (especially domestic and state-owned ones), its equity participation tends to be associated with negative effects. In such cases, capital injections apparently either become unnecessary (perhaps because of the existence of internal capital markets within groups) or are tunneled through the pyramids to support inefficient allocations.
In conclusion, our results suggest that policy makers considering minority equity stakes as an industrial policy tool should avoid pyramidal groups with poor governance and target instead stand-alone firms; focus investments where there is a clear need to undertake productive capital expenditures by well-run firms; allocate equity capital directly in target firms instead of indirectly through layers of ownership; and progressively exit targeted firms as the local institutional context develops. Under these guidelines, the grabbing hand of the state (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998 ) may eventually become a helping hand.
Suggestions for a Future Research Agenda
The effect of state minority ownership in other institutional contexts. Admittedly, some of our results may be idiosyncratic to Brazil and to its particular mechanisms of minority state participation. Thus, future work is needed to verify the generalizability of our results to other developing and emerging economies using other channels of state capital and other types of outcomes. More theoretical work is also needed to explain why minority state equity remains generally widespread, as discussed in the introduction. Our theory rests on the idea that those minority stakes can help firms subject to scarce external financing and therefore is unable to predict any performance-based impact in more developed economies with active and liquid capital markets (e.g., OECD, 2005) .
The role of state loans (besides equity). Along these lines, it would also be important to examine the effect of not only state equity, but also debt. As of 2011, Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello, and Marcon (2012) identified 286 development banks throughout the world that heavily provide firms with long-term loans besides equity. We argue here that, from a transaction cost standpoint, equity has the advantage of supporting risky, nonredeployable investment. However, given the prevalence of loans from development banks, it would also be informative to examine the conditions under which loans can also prop up firmlevel development. Through their loans, development banks can also help restructure targeted firms and improve their performance as a result (George & Prabhu, 2000) .
The effect of state capital on innovation. In connection with the work of Mahmood and Rufin (2005) , who focus on innovation as a key outcome variable, one might look at whether having government as an investor leads firms to be more innovative. Some have proposed that states are instrumental in fostering basic research in various sectors such as computing, health, and agriculture (Graham, 2010; Mazzucato, 2011; Mowery, 1984) . A recent study by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) showed that innovation is positively affected by the presence of "institutional" investors who can increase managerial incentives to execute riskier, long-term innovation projects. Since states should be long-term investors, then we should see innovative activity correlated with new state investments in the minority equity of entrepreneurial firms with constrained innovation opportunities. Although here we focus on how state capital can revamp fixed assets, one could also examine its owners. We then performed similar analyses and found no consistent, significant effects of minority foreign equity. A possible explanation is that such minority foreign positions may simply serve as "real options" for future expansion; they may therefore not necessarily affect local profitability or investment. effect on more intangible aspects, such as R&D expenditures and knowledge spillovers among firms.
The diversity of state ownership and governance. Minority stakes may also come in various forms: Beyond development banks, governments have variously used public pension funds, life insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, state-owned holding companies, and so forth (Wooldridge, 2012) . It would be interesting to assess how these various forms of equity differ and affect firm performance. Furthermore, the governance of such minority investments should be studied in a more microanalytical way. Do governments, as minority shareholders, form alliances with other private owners to pursue certain types of strategies? Arguably, governments may participate in coalitions with other shareholders and hence exert influence on firm-level decisions even if they hold only minority stakes. For instance, in 2009, the Brazilian government, as a minority shareholder through BNDES and public pension funds (Figure 1) , was able to pressure the mining firm Vale to invest locally in steel mills and buy ships assembled in the country. This form of residual interference will be observed, however, only when other minority shareholders collude with the state, which is not always a feasible outcome (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014) . In other words, future work could more closely examine complex corporate networks formed by state and private actors and the consequences of those networks for firm-level performance.
To be sure, opportunities abound to study the various forms through which states can either promote or derail firm-level development through complex interactions with investors and entrepreneurs. We sincerely hope that our work helps spark future work in strategic management and related disciplines to more closely assess alternative forms of state capitalism and their firm-level implications. 
